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Abstract. This paper considers a perspective of the deontological approach to natural law as constituting a satisfactory opinion of the nature 
of law, and analyses the main features of natural law theory providing that the law and morality are interlinked. It is impractical to decide 
a case entirely upon codified legal rules, as judges have a duty to apply the moral value of the system. The paper acknowledges that the 
concept of law is prominent in the moral values of society, as if the law is exceptionally unjust it should not be applied. 
 




Law is concerned with maintaining a basic order of people’s conduct and affairs, laying down standards on how 
humans ought to behave (Veitch et al., 2007, p. 7). Lord Steyn said that ‘[the court] must act like a court of law 
and not like a court of morals. (…) What may count in a situation of difficulty and uncertainty is not the subjective 
view of the judge but what he reasonably believes that the ordinary citizen would regard as right’ (McFarlane and 
Another v. Tayside Health Board [1999], per Lord Steyn at pp. 977–978). Thus, there has been an ongoing debate 
in jurisprudence as to what constitutes the best character of the nature of law (Veitchet et al., 2007, p. 123). The 
definition of law has been the subject of many debates (Salmond & Fitzgerald, 1966, p. 12), and its notion is 
surrounded by philosophical perplexities (Hart, 1963, p. 6). Thus, the law can be regarded as a basic concept of 
jurisprudence (King, 1963); with the various theories of law advanced to what the nature of the law might be; so 
building up a complete and rounded picture of the subject (Salmond & Fitzgerald, 1966, p. 13). Some authors 
argue that there is a lack of existing connection between law and morality (legal positivism; Black, 1979), whereas 
others suggest that there is an interplay between law and morality (natural law; Strauss, 1968, p. 137). Presently, 
natural law appears to be an important weapon of political and legal ideology (Freeman, 2014, p. 75), and it is 
often argued that natural law forms the basis of what the law is.  
 
This article aims to present a discussion of the deontological approach to natural law as being the coherent 
approach as to the nature of law, as we have witnessed an upturn of the theory of natural law, with an increased 
modern natural law scholarship. Natural law indeed aims at analysing the essence of moral theory, especially in 
times of crisis. The notion of natural law could be claimed as being as old as philosophy itself,3 and it is presumed 
that its importance is still witnessed in the 21st century. The author assumes that natural law is normatively and 
 
1 The author would like to thank Dr Oles Andriychuk for his helpful comments and support. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 PhD Candidate, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom. 
3 Natural law was first invoked by Stoicism which, in an era of a deep political transformation, provided people with a 
reference to morality.  
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objectively embodied in modern society and dependent on human nature. Natural law reflects the desire of humans 
to work out the best approach to lead fulfilling lives, given the nature of our lives and social environments we, as 
a society, settle in. Yet, it is not enough to uphold the defined concepts of natural law; what is necessary is to 
demonstrate that the historically defined debates are still sound and relevant in the environment of our century. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse all of the possible angles of natural law and their impacts 
on the conditions of our century, this article looks at the following key elements of natural law: the consistency of 
natural law; the immoral law is not law; the debate of Fuller–Hart; and the connection of the social contract to 
natural law. These particular characteristics serve as the backbone of this research as they allow us to demonstrate 
different kinds of natural legal theories which differ from one another regarding the role of morality in the 
determination of legal norms’ authority. This research applies methodologies of law and philosophy as the most 
appropriate approach for reflecting on the relationship between law and morality. Amongst these elements 
explained, it becomes evident that they indicate an understandable moral criterion, necessary in an age affected 
by moral disagreement or ambiguities. 
 
1. Natural Law is Consistent 
 
The bases of natural law theories, ranging from classical times to the present day, have been shaped by the reality 
that law is formed from the rules of, and in conformity with, nature. Natural law could be perceived as internally 
consistent (Dias, 2013, Chapter 20). Positivism appears to ascertain that legal obligations are creatures of general 
legal rules. This means that a judge is not able to enforce an obligation when they determine a case on the 
foundations of their circumspection because, according to positivism, the judge’s carefulness would only come 
into play when there is a lack of general legal rule (Salmon & Fitzgerald, 1966, p. 15).4 This follows Dworkin’s 
point – that the law cannot be merely a model of rules (Tur, 1977, p. 42). Therefore, it has been suggested that it 
is impossible to interpret any source of law accurately without taking any consideration of morality (Dworkin, 
1967, p. 14). Thus, Dworkin suggested that positivism is narrow, and provides no theoretical niche for principles 
to be found all around us (Giudice, 2015, p. 214). Everyone who works with the law is familiar only with the 
principles of law (Walker, 1982, p. 34). John Stuart Mill claimed that: ‘[m]en may be competent lawyers without 
general education, but it depends upon the general education to make them philosophic lawyers, who (…) are 
cramming their memory with details’ (Mill, 2017, p. 527). Nevertheless, judges often face the problem of moral 
duty in the courts. Natural law suggests that everyone has a duty to act in accordance with morality and obey the 
law (Benditt, 1978, p. 92). Therefore, morality is the criterium for law being law at all. John Finnis, a leading 
natural jurisprudence scholar, analysed the relationship between moral reasoning and the legal rules in the case 
Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland (1999).5 The case resulted in the question as to whether the House 
of Lords’ decision to remove life-sustaining treatment was morally justified, where the judge justified his decision 
by claiming that it was ‘undoubtedly the law’ (Finnis, 1993, p. 329). Thus, the argument itself resulted in the 
questioning of euthanasia, as stipulated by the natural law – i.e. being contrary to God’s will (Wacks, 2009, p. 47). 
The dilemma of the case involves the clash that takes place on the ethical plateau, with the subsuming of legal 
reason to ethical reason, and the deontological approach to the case (Veitch et al., 2007, p. 128). Bingham 
recognised early that the case shared ground between both parties, in that ‘profound respect for the sanctity of life 
is embedded in our law and our moral philosophy’ (Wacks, 2009, p. 80). Both Keown and Finnis criticise the 
decision in Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland6 as a misunderstanding of the concept of the sanctity 
of life (Keown, 1997, pp. 482–503; Finnis, 1993, pp. 329–337), as that act was clearly against Aristotle’s views 
on the duty of value of the right to live.7 Keown observed that Lord Keith reached the conclusion in the concern 
of the State, arguing that the Court adjudged Bland’s life to be worthless (Keown, 1997, p. 494). Finnis argued 
 
4 The central notion of the natural law is that there exist objective moral principles which could be discovered by natural 
reason, and ordinary humans conform to these principles. 
5 In this case, Anthony Bland had suffered injuries in the Hillsborough Stadium disaster. 
6 Dworkin criticised the case as well (1997, p. 40). 
7 ‘But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous 
man, but rather of a coward; for it is weakness to fly from troubles, and the suicide does not endure death because it is noble 
to do so, but to escape evil’ (Aristotle, 1999, pp. 13–17).  
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that in the ‘basic good’, life should not be under rationale as if it is moral or legal (McCarthy, 2015). Additionally, 
one of the leading positivists, Hart, was unwilling to accept the conception of the end of humanity, as it appears 
that he based his argument on the deontological approach to the natural law (Coyle, 2013, p. 93). Hart stipulated 
that each person should have a duty towards one another (Hart, 1994, p. 80). His ideas derived from five truisms 
of human nature, each relating to the desire of an individual to survive: vulnerability, limited resources, equality, 
understanding and strength of will, and limited altruism (Gommer, 2011, p. 141). As Hart, furthermore, explained: 
‘nothing is to be gained in the theoretical or scientific study of law as a social phenomenon’ (Hart, 1994, p. 209).8 
Thus, judges have a duty to apply the ‘moral value of the system’ (Dworkin, 1978, p. 81). For over a decade, 
Dworkin developed, contrary to the positivists’ insistence, upon juridical discretion in hard cases (Robison, 2002, 
p. 85), wherein such cases the right legal answer was nearly always determined by the natural law. Therefore, to 
reflect that consideration, another natural lawyer, Michael Detmold, gave an argument that there are necessary 
connections to the application of the moral and legal (1984, p. 12). 
 
2. ‘An Unjust Law is no Law at All’ 
 
The ordinary laws are often not ideal.9 For natural lawyers, law consists of the rules of morality. For natural 
lawyers, the central determination is that the validity of law would involve engaging in moral reasoning. This 
would help to determine whether the law is just or unjust. St Thomas Aquinas defined the law as ‘an ordinance of 
reason for the common good made by him who the care of the community’. Thus, St Aquinas believed that states 
are natural institutions, produced with the duty of elementary social needs. St Aquinas’ theory was characterised 
by the deontological approach, placing an emphasis on the moral theories to guide to one’s obligations.  St Thomas 
claimed that when the law is unjust in respect to the end (in that the law is conductive not to the good but to the 
cupidity and glory of the law-giver), or in respect to the law-giver (as clearly exceeding his powers), or in respect 
to the community, then the law is in contradiction to the natural law, and thus is not law at all. The deontological 
approach of St Thomas works towards the morality of law providing better integration into society, aiming to 
secure what is wrong or right. This is associated with the St Augustine maxim: ‘an unjust law is no law at all’. 
Nevertheless, the positivist lawyers criticised that tenet mainly as their views on the law itself depend on the social 
facts and not their merits; with Kelsen insisting that that there was no place for morality in law. Also, Hart stated 
that ‘no one would have any reason to obey except fear and still less, of course, any moral obligation to obey’ 
(1957, p. 596). Another positivist, Bentham, regarded the natural law as being ‘nonsense on stilts’, claiming that 
the positivist approach would contribute to the greatest happiness. However, such attacks are not well founded. 
Even if positive law is prescribed, it is still open for natural lawyers to contend that they describe the duty of the 
individuals to obey the law, imposing the obligations onto all members of society. According to naturalism, there 
is a close connection between the duty to obey the law and morality. The moral obligation to obey the law attaches 
a serious weight, and it can be rejected only after serious reflection and only for reasons of weight. For example, 
if one considers the realm of criminal law, then when a court imposes a sanction on the thief, this action would be 
considered as moral, whereas if a private individual or a group where to lock a thief up themselves that will be 
criticised as being immoral. Yet Finnis suggested that even the unjust law might be carrying moral authority, as 
long as the people have a moral duty to obey it, which results in a better action for the community. It is widely 
accepted that one has a prima facie duty to obey the law. Raz discussed that there is the necessary moral duty 
attached to the natural law. This is because the law should be obeyed by everyone, as the law demands it. The 
achievement of the good and just society would be achieved only by the deontology of the natural law. Thus, any 
human cannot be deprived of their natural law, and therefore the codified positive legal rules are only protecting 





8 Dworkin took a slightly different approach, in reference to positivism, by defining a notion of ‘hard case’ as ‘when a certain 
case cannot be resolved by the use of an unequivocal legal rule, set out by the appropriate body prior to the event, then the 
judge has, accordingly to that theory, a ‘discretion’ to decide the case either way’ (1978, p. 81). 
9‘An unjust law is no law at all’ comes from Latin: ‘Lex iniusta non est lex’ (Asher & Simpson, 1994, p. 2058). 
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3. Law and Morality 
 
A debate between two well-known professors, Hart and Fuller, was concerned with the problem of immoral laws 
and the separability of law and morality (George, 1999, p. 62). The debate arose after questioning the legal system 
of the Nazi Third Reich (Penner, 2012, p. 63), with the immediate focus on a so-called ‘grudge case’.10 The Hart–
Fuller debate can be understood as a debate about the nature of legal principles, and specifically about their 
legitimacy (Ketchen, 1999). Fuller introduced the dualistic concept of morality, expressing the distinction between 
‘morality of duty’ and ‘morality of aspiration’ (Pavone, 2014). Such a concept received relatively little critique 
from Hart, a legal positivist, who concluded that this aspect ‘contributed to moral philosophy’ (Witteveen & van 
der Burg, 1999, p. 165). The morality of aspiration was associated with the Greek philosophy ‘of the Good Life, 
of excellence, of the fullest realisation of human powers’ (Fuller, 1969, p. 5). In the second type of morality, Fuller 
(1969) indicated that it ‘lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible (...), speaks in 
terms of “though shalt not”, and condemns men for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living’ (p. 
15). This concept places an emphasis on the moral duty of natural law as giving the best consequences. Thus, it is 
another example that deontology is connected with utilitarianism. Hart criticises the whole notion, identifying that 
right and duties have nothing to do with one’s morals.11 Thus, Hart’s argument was that the Court of Germany 
was wrong in the grudge case, as the law must be valid, highlighting the necessity of retrospective legislation 
(Banerjee, 2017). On the other hand, Fuller accepted the verdict, claiming that it created respect for law and 
morality (Paton, 2014). The theorists indicated that the Finnis approach was more favoured, thus claiming that 
there is a moral duty attached to the law. Radbruch corresponded to such a debate, claiming that ‘even though in 
plain case law can contradict some principles of morality, if the law is extremely unjust it should not be applied’ 
(Peczenik, 2008, p. 236). This suggests that positive law is connected with the duties prescribed by the natural law 
(Finnis, 1993, p. 329). Finnis argued that ‘the positive law is a necessary medium for the expression of natural 
principles’ (Davies, 1994, p. 70). Also, both Hart and Fuller considered that there is a connection between law and 
morality that would be seen as the normalising facility of law (Cane, 2010). Furthermore, the sociological 
jurisprudence theorist Hegel indicated that there is a lack of logical completeness itself, finding that there must be 
law and morality as sourced within one’s completeness of freedom (Friedmann, 1967, p. 343). Consequently, the 
unmoral law is not to be accepted, as the law would indicate the validity of the legal rules would be dependent on 
satisfaction of the moral standard, because moral and legal validity are intertwined. 
 
4. Natural Law and Social Contract 
 
Furthermore, the natural law aims to establish an objective order (Einwechter, 2018).12 The ideas prescribed by 
natural law theorists were used for many different purposes, influencing the rise of a tide of individualism 
(Friedmann, 1967, p. 117). 13  Kant viewed the idea of the social contract as being a postulate of reasons 
(D’Entreves, 1994, p. 110). In addition, Kant is viewed as the deontologist, and his theory as one of the most 
influential natural law theories (Smith, 2016). One ought to consider that the theory of the social contract in 
deontological natural law is connected to ethical consequentialism.14 For example, Ross (1930/2003, pp. 21–27) 
listed two prima facie consequentialist duties of beneficence and self-improvement in order to promote the greatest 
 
10 Some background is necessary: in this case a German citizen’s wife reported her husband to the Gestapo for criticising 
Hitler’s conduct of war. Subsequently, her husband was sentenced to death. Nevertheless, he survived the war as his sentence 
was fulfilled via service as a Russian soldier. After the war, the husband set in motion legal proceedings against his wife 
(Pappe, 1960, p. 264). 
11 ‘The outer boundaries of this wide conception cannot be determined from this book with any precision, since the author 
does not give us any account of what “rules” are’ (Hart, 1983, p. 343). 
12 Additionally, Grotius states that: ‘Natural law is the dictate of right reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or 
disagreement with the rational nature, has in it moral necessity or moral turpitude; and consequently that such act is 
commanded or forbidden by God, the author of nature’ (Coker, 1938, p. 411). 
13 Those actions included the English Revolution of 1798, the French Revolution of 1789 or the American Declaration of 
Independence. 
14 Kant criticised consequentionalism, but his theory might be perceived as connected to consequentionalism (Saja, 2013, p. 
89) 
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good. Yet this statement requires further elaboration, especially on the deontological theory provided in Kant’s 
work.  
 
In his work, Kant provided an analysis of morality by drawing common-sense ideas of ‘good will’ and ‘duty’, 
which allowed him to believe that individuals are autonomous and free, as long as morality is not an illusionary 
concept (Kant, 1785/2012, Chapters 1–2). According to Kant, moral rules are universal and are derived from 
human reason; with humans having the capacity to be rational. His understanding might be demonstrated with an 
action-reaction response: if an individual perceives a certain act as morally permissible, then society will perceive 
such conduct as morally permissible. Similar reasoning can be applied to morally forbidden acts. Humans’ actions 
are supposed to be based on obligation, without any emotional influence on humans’ morality. Hence, morality 
should be seen as a set of guidance which acts to prevent certain acts and is independent of a human’s desires. In 
Kant's reasoning, only morality could allow individuals to be ‘worthy of happiness’ (Kant, 1797/1964, p. 41).15 
Therefore, to achieve a satisfying legal system, the state needs to ensure that ‘each person remains at liberty to 
seek his happiness in any way he thinks best so long as he does not violate (…) the rights of other fellow subjects’ 
(Kant, 1795/1983, p. 7).  
 
The essential feature of the doctrine of the social contract (Friedmann, 1967, p. 117)16 is that from a state of nature, 
where there is no law and order, individuals formed societies which required some contract under which they 
would respect each other and live in peace (Elahi, 2005). To such a contract, one shall immediately add another 
contract in which the united people undertake to obey a government of their choice (Elahi, 2005).17 The doctrine 
of the social contract connects all its protagonists in that the source of political power can be found in the people, 
and they are unanimously against the deduction of political authority from above, whether from the grace of God 
or divine law (Friedmann, 1967, p. 118). One shall review that democracy is perceived as being sourced from 
natural law theory (Calhoun, 1960, p. 31). Positivists, such as Bentham or Hume, rejected the idea of the social 
contract. Nevertheless, the theory of the social contract has been used by four notable legal and political thinkers: 
Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Such theories are still influential. According to Grotius, a social contract 
is constructed for a twofold purpose; firstly, as the justification of the entire duty of the people to obey to the 
government, and secondly, to create a foundation for stable and legally binding relations among the state (Dos 
Reis Falcao, 2018). In his theory, the state has been constructed by the social contract, by means of people having 
chosen the most suitable form of government (Becker & Reyelt, 2004, p. 14). Additionally, Grotius is bound to 
admit that the ruler is bound by the principles of natural law, which could be seen as valid without a promise. 
Thus, the keeping of the promise is of greatest importance to the principle of natural law (Friedmann, 1967, p. 
119).18 On the other hand, Hobbes, a strong positivist supporter, stated that man lived in chaos before the social 
contract,19 resulting in humans’ lives being ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 1651/2017, p. 269). 
Thus, self-preservation is the greatest lesson of natural law, and is important to a human’s existence as a notion 
which allows for the preserving of the existence of each individual and of society as a whole. The deontological 
approach would require to ‘act only on that maxim thought which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law’ (Kant, 1781/1998, p. 421). The main idea of Hobbes was to rule out the civil rebellion, 
which he regarded as being the greatest evil, thus Hobbes (1651/2017) being against the natural law. Although 
Hobbes was regarded as a positivist, his views comprise the concepts of the natural law by recognising the good 
reason for building a coherent probative law, based on the basic function of natural law (Doliwa, 2012). Locke, 
who believed that the era before the social contract was a paradise (Strauss, 1965, p. 224), claimed that the social 
contract was needed to secure individual’s rights. There is positivistic criticism of Locke’s theory on the apparent 
 
15 See also, Kant’s notion that personal happiness is a key feature of the good life: ‘to assure one’s own happiness is a duty 
(at least indirectly)…’ (1972, p. 64).  
16 The use of the social contract has been found as far back as medieval times. It can be traced back to the Italian Marsilius of 
Padua (1270–1342). 
17Locke also stated that: ‘no man can be subject to the political power of another without his own consent’ (1689/2010, p. 
95).  
18Grotius also indicated that he was in favour of an organic conception of the states (von Gierke, 1957, p. 55). 
19 It is worth remembering the famous Hobbes tenet: ‘a war of every Man against every Man’ (Hobbes, 1651/2017, p. 269). 
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lack of logical grounds. Nevertheless, the deontological natural law approaches of Locke indicated that ‘utility is 
not the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it’ (Kantor, 2013, p. 92). 
Such an idea of Locke became the highest positivist law of the US through its incorporation in the Bill of Rights 
of the Constitution, thus then becoming part of the positive law (Curry, 2017). Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social 
contract theory of natural law had a great influence upon the French and American revolution, and subsequent 
politics. Barker noted that: ‘Rousseau is a Janus-like figure in the history of natural law’ (Mulgan, 1994, p. 373). 
In his approach, Rousseau attempted to prove the superiority of the natural rights of man and organic society 
(Friedmann, 1967, p. 125). Additionally, the justification of the people’s sovereignty is described as being freedom 
and equality of all people (Ochoa Espejo, 2011, p. 130). Such an argument had a basis in their internal happiness. 
Rousseau, further, confirms individual autonomy by linking morality to the notion of freedom (Stern, 2011, p. 20). 
Thus, for Rousseau, a subjugated individual can have no morality to their acts, as he claimed ‘to remove all liberty 
from his will, is to remove all morality from his acts’ (Robinson, 2016, p. 20). Also, Rousseauian theory was 
analysed by D’Entréves, who claimed that the landmark of Rousseau indicated the strongest theory of democracy, 
indicating that therein lies the cleavage between legal and moral obligations (D’Entreves, 1996, p. 143). Kant 
reached a similar conclusion to Rousseau’s, where there is the necessity of the general will (Freeman, 2014, p. 
103). Therefore, deontological positive law could be regarded as a manifestation of deontological natural law, 
placing its emphasis on the outcome for a better society (Freeman, 2014, p. 103). In this sense, the author assumes 
that the concept of a better society is understood as a hypothetical concept, similar to the concept of perfect market 
identifiable in competition law, as history illustrates that there might be instances of an evil person leading a 
society. Yet, realistically, the concept of a better society can be achieved by having a genuine legal system which 
meets the demands of justice. The better society could be understood as a society which substituted justice and 
wisdom: particularity, it is necessary to disclose the obligatory duties on the moral sense of free people of a free 
society and the right to introduce suitable steps for future development, which would be based on safeguarding 
liberty against those who seek to destroy it. Consequently, to understand the freedom of the people is to understand 
their moral obligations, as it has been remarked that ‘no other law counts, because in the realm of freedom there 
is not law’ (Weinred, 1990, p. 95). Similar conclusions were reached by Hobbes, who argued that morality and 




To conclude, one shall perceive that natural law with the deontological approach has played an important role on 
the ethical plateau as to the meaning of the nature of law. It appears that society should be a supporter of 
deontological natural law, as this will result in the emergence of a better society. The positive law might be viewed 
as narrow, since it is impossible to decide purely upon the codified legal rules, as per Dworkin – the law should 
not be a mere set of rules. For the natural law, the action to achieve a better society is important. Furthermore, it 
is possible to apply the tenet of ‘an unjust law is not law’ even today, since this notion has been favoured even by 
the supporters of positive law, who indicated that the law and morality could be seen as connected. Also, the well-
known Hart–Fuller debate, surrounding the question of if the law could be moral, resulted in Fuller’s approach 
being favoured, and gives another example of the connection between law and morality. Additionally, the 
deontological natural law could be seen as the foundation of the most remarked upon political theory – the social 
contract. The deontological natural law favoured by Kant was influenced by the theory of the social contract. The 
social contract had its foundations laid in the medieval period, and was later fleshed out by both positivists and 
naturalists with both the deontological and consequentialist approaches. Both positivists and naturalists with both 
deontological and utilitarian approaches concluded that morality is an important threshold in the law, which would 
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